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Narrative Rehearsal, Expression, and Goethe's
"Wandrers Nachtlied 11"
Richard Eldridge

It is by now all but a commonplace that modern human subjects face
increased difficulties in finding and sustaining meaningful orientation and
r utes of significant inre.re t in life in compaJison with their forebears in
less technologically advanced circumstances. To b ure, modernity brings
ignilicant advantage with it. Not only are there the benefits of modern
technologies of food production medicine, transportation, and o on in ea ing the material condition of life, ther are a l o the charms of being able co
an increa ed e tent to choose for one elf what ore of cial identity co
<level p from among a wid r array of possibilities. onstraints of inc me
circum tan e, available options, and opportunities and expectations et by
others till no doubt e ist but there are also both new po ibilitie and
increased degrees of geographic and social mobility. No one in 1200 c.E.
could move from Kansas or Kuala Lumpur or Kinshasa to Manhattan or
Mumbai or Moscow in order to get an education and become a polymer
chemist, plumber, police officer, professional tennis player, or performance
artist.
With these increased possibilities of social identity, however, there often
also come increased uncertainties and anxieties. Human beings at any level
of culture are always and everywhere capable of reflection and are hence the
kinds of beings who are capable of calling their own being into question.
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This fact is rooted in the emergence in us of specifically discursive consciousness as opposed to mere sensory intake. Unlike other animals, we classify
things under concepts, sometimes the very same physical object under different concepts, depending on our contexts of use and engagement with it.
Or-depending on your views about animals and concepts-we do so at
least with enormously greater plasticity and flexibility of attention than do
other animals. Hence we can ask, is this (stick) a weapon, a piece of firewood, a building mat~rial, or a drawing implement? Given our plasticities
of engagement and attention, questions of correctness arise for us in a way
in which they do not arise for other animals, and these questions of correctness have to do also with what is wanted of us in a given context and with
how others are engaging with an object of attention.
Cultures existing at subsistence level have to get things right-is that a
tiger?-but they are not so much occupied with reflection on plasticities of
attention, engagement, and practice. Strongly tribal or traditional cultures
may slot their members into courses of action with few alternatives and
without much occasion for reflection. In modernity, however, things are
different. With the growth of scientific and technological knowledge,
increasing urbanization, and expanding market economies, diversity within
cultures becomes the norm. Individuals begin to have to make a way of life,
more and more by skill and will and less and less by necessity and tradition.
The question of how it is best or most fruitful or right to live becomes
pressing. This question arose in some form in urban centers in the ancient
world-for example, in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries B.C.E. But
even there this question arises in part as a function of urbanization and the
increase in possibilities of subjective particularity that it brings with it.
These possibilities of subjective particularity then explode with increasing
force at least from the early seventeenth century onwards (with complicated, interesting roots and antecedents).
Once reflection on attention and on engagements with the world has
begun, it is both urgent and all but impossible to rein it in. It is urgent in
that, without reflection of the right kind, subjective particularity is in danger
of running riot and culminating in all kinds of unchastened competitive
individualism, factionalism, and violence, particularly as religion declines in
cultural authority with the rise of science. It is all but impossible to rein it
in, in that no absolute ontological ground is available to discursive consciousness, from which it emerges and knowledge of which might guide its
course. Think of Holderlin's "Sein und Urteil" fragment or of Wordsworth's sense of his fall out of naturalness and into discursivity.
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In the absence, then, of available fundamentalisms, one possible way of
arriving reflectively at modes of attention and engagement in which one can
believe, or in which one can believe more fully, is through narrative
rehearsal. One may be unable to know by theorizing, or have at hand no
ready way to know, what human life as such is for. But one might hope to
come to a better, clearer sense of what one's particular life might best or
better look like, and this sense might manifest itself in feeling that one has
thought through certain possible larger shapes of life, for oneself and possibly for some like-minded and like-situated others. That is, one might tell a
story to oneself and others about how one might move in time from A to B
to W, hoping that certain imagined itineraries will emerge in feeling as better
supporting conviction in their ability to sustain a sense of lived meaningfulness than do some others. This strategy-imaginative, narrative rehearsal of
possibilities, thence tested in feeling for whether or how well they support
a sense of lived meaningfulness-at any rate was prominently taken up and
developed in Germany in the decades immediately following 1781, as German thinkers and writers struggled both with how to receive Kant's critical
philosophy, given its dismissal of the possibility of ultimate metaphysical
knowledge, and with larger problems of secularization and social pluralization. Just what, it was wondered, are we to do with ourselves, and how are
we to support a lived answer to this question, if both the will of God in any
detail is unavailable to us and we cannot know theoretically what we are
and are made for?
To the extent, then, that we continue to live within a modern cultural
dispensation, with senses of social possibility, of the unavailability of ultimate metaphysical knowledge, and of a consequent need for meaningful
orientation in life, which senses resemble the sense of the human subject
that was prominent in post-Kantian Germany, it may be of some help to
consider exactly how Kant and some of his successors turned to narrative
in the service of emotional clarification about possibilities of meaningful
life.
One place in which it is especially clear that Kant is caught up in an agon
of reflection on fit or fruitful modes of life, aiming at but failing to achieve
full assurance in cultural practice, is his 1786 essay "What Is Orientation in
Thinking?" In this essay Kant argues, along Cartesian lines, that "it is possible to remain secure against all error if one does not venture to pass judgment in cases where one's knowledge is insufficient for the judgment in
question" (1991, 240). This is often a valuable policy in the exact sciences.
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There are, however, also cases in which there is a need to pass judgment
despite the insufficiency of knowledge, notably cases involving judgments
of rightness in action. In these cases we may, Kant argues, first, establish that
a concept is free from contradiction, and, second, use only pure concepts of
the understanding, free from all sensible content, in formulating judgments.
In this way, we may in particular come to a purely rational belief (that does
not, however, am,ount to knowledge) in the existence of a God without any
sensible characteristics and who provides no reliable evidence of his presence in history. The belief in such a God is, Kant argues, practically necessary in that we need, in order to achieve orientation in both theory and
practice, to assume that there is purposiveness in nature and that God exists
as its only possible ground, even if he neither displays himself within this
purposiveness nor makes its direction evident. This purely rational belief is
then "the signpost or compass ... [such that] the man of ordinary (but
healthy) reason can use it to plan his course, for both theoretical and practical purposes, in complete conformity with the whole end of his destiny"
(245).
It is, as Kant's successors found, possible-indeed, unavoidable-to find
this recommendation both intriguing and relatively empty. We are barred
from substantial knowledge of God's providence and from substantial
knowledge of our destiny. As Kant remarks in his 1784 "Universal History"
essay, nature "reveals something, but very little" of a path toward a kingdom of ends (1963, 22). How, then, is orientation "in complete conformity
with the whole of [one's] destiny" possible? The categorical imperative sets
certain fixed prohibitions and certain abstract ideals, but it is far from delineating this path. At the very least, substantial imaginative casuistry coupled
with historical and cultural understanding will be needed.
How, then, within present cultural practice might a sense of orientation
be effectively achieved and sustained? A number of possibilities were suggested and canvassed in immediate reaction to Kant. I will sketch six, with
breathtaking speed. The latter five in particular involve a turn toward the
use of narrative and some narrowing of a difference between philosophy as
a discipline (at least when ethical questions about cultivation are in view)
and certain forms of literary practice.
(1) One might undertake to provide a better grounding for a philosophical system that describes both the emergence of discursive consciousness
and its path toward a destiny of achieved freedom. This representationalistdescriptivest-theoretical stance is, crudely oversimplifying, the stance of
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Reinhold and Fichte. Paul Franks (2005) has described very well the imperative toward system that dominates their thinking: all or nothing. One must
understand everything-the discursive mind, its place in nature, its destiny,
and the path toward it-or one will have understood nothing, or nothing
really important. This alternative all-or-nothing maps, I suggest, onto the
alternative: life as a fully achieved human subject or death in reactivity and
ungrounded conventionality. A difficulty of this stance, as Fichte already
comes to see in his political turn, is that the emphasis on correct theoretical
representation of our condition reinforces the turn toward reflection about
representation that itself distances one from meaningful engagements in culture and practice. Its wages-however much the Fichtean Absolute is not
an individual subject-are isolation and detachment, as well as desperate
repeated attempts to ground the system convincingly. 1 And this suggests
that the antithesis-either fully achieved, absolutely valuable and exemplary
human life, or death in life-is itself too sharply drawn. Surely there must
be a middle way? But how is it to be found, once the sense of the possibility
of death in present conventional social life has arisen, so that something
new needs to be done? 2
(2) Hegel, too, pursues the imperative toward system, but in contrast
with Reinhold and with much of Fichte, he sees the description of our
stances as possessors of discursive consciousness as always bound up with
practical attitudes in culture that are held by both the describer and the
object of description. Teilnahme, participation, absorbs and informs any
purely representational stance. Stability comes only at the end of history,
when theoretical description and practical stance within culture have settled
into mutual transparency, as a result of the long march of trial-and-error,
of the labor of the negative. Here, to put it mildly, one may wonder whether
any such settling really has or is taking place. Perhaps in certain ways, in
certain regions of North Atlantic culture, say, en mesure. But the relations
between such settlings as exist and persisting instabilities surely still remain
to be worked out.
(3) One might, against the imperative toward system, emphasize the
spontaneity of the human subject that is bound up with the ability to reflect
and to think things otherwise. This is, of course, the way of Schlegel and
Witz, more recently urged on us as well by Blanchot and by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy (see Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988). The power of spontaneity-the power to think and act otherwise, with improvisatory
aptness-in the face of what is done is not to be scanted. Exercise of this
power is bound up with feeling oneself to be a subject at all, and that feeling
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deserves some nurturance. As Blanchot puts it, "to speak poetically is to
make possible a non-transitive speech whose task is not to say things (not
to disappear into what it signifies) but to say (itself) in letting itself say, yet
without taking itself as the new object of this language without object"
(1993, 357). One may, however, nonetheless wonder, even after all contextualist constraints have been specified, whether enough stability in life is
afforded by the cµltivation of irony and agility. What J. M. Bernstein calls
"theoretical exorbitance" (2006, 157) attaches to philosophizing always on
the run, so that a certain nomadism results. Beginning, always and always
over again, "Jena Romanticism," in Bernstein's words, "cancels any synthesis, harmonization, riveting together of materiality and the social sign"
(158). It is no accident that the Jena Romantics produced no great literary
works. Without at least some stable enough harmonization of materiality
and the social sign, a collapse into succumbing to the evanescent blandishments of consumerism is possible. I might, that is to say, wittily and ironically "buy" this or that-my style of dress, my friends, my books, my
religion, my household furnishings, or my spouse-and so be pulled apart,
never really recognizing myself as a subject over time.
(4) Underlying spontaneity, Witz, and agility, one might appeal to the
affordances of what Benjamin called unseen affinities or Adorno, following
Benjamin, called fugitive experiences. The dominant economy and its culture may be commodified. But there remain pockets of resistance-the
oddly difficult work of art that cannot readily be replicated in a fungible
commodity or the traces of childhood where there is a sense of thickness of
experience, as in Benjamin's Berliner Kindheit-that might be allowed to
resurface with complex disturbatory and partially recuperative effects.
Trauma and loss might be worked through, and some lines of self-continuity
might be achieved, despite trauma and loss. Energies might be heightened.
One might also think here of spots of time in Wordsworth or of certain
moments in Proust. Both literary practice and philosophical criticism might
undertake the work of discerning and reanimating the fugitive intimations
of something beyond commodity life that may be found in both art and life.
This, too, is not a suggestion to be scanted. But one might again wonder
here just how much stability is enabled, and just what criteria there might
be for evaluating and integrating the affordances of various fugitive intimations. One could further wonder what the costs of yoking disturbance even
in part to self-recovery and self-stability might be. Such a yoking may somewhat underrate the artistry of the work and the disruptive powers of art.
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(5) Instead of system, spontaneity, or the recovery of the fugitive, one
might invest one's energies in the work of forming an artistic presentation
or Darstellung, hoping to direct and stabilize these energies within the activity of artistic construction itself. This idea runs throughout defenses of the
autonomy of art from any instrumental purposes, and it is usefully developed in David Wellbery's recent critical writing on Goethe and Eichendorff.
Wellbery terms this strategy of artistic construction the pursuit of the simulacrum. "The presentation, which in mimesis possesses a transparency that
is oriented toward an ideal realm of depth, attains in the simulacrum its own
proper thickness" (2006, 147; my translation). The result of this pursuit of
a proper thickness is, in Eichendorff's "Wiinschelrute" and "Der Abend"
and in Goethe's "Der Fischer," "a romantic lyric that is separate from all
enthusiasm for nature and closeness to the folksong, and that is instead to
be understood as an investigation of the intrinsic possibilities of a medium"
(151). (Wellbery concedes that the performative aspect of mimesis-the
text's transmission of a message about something-is also important. Here
he is principally correcting an overemphasis on message as against the powers of the work itself to engage and absorb us.) The strategy of constructing
absorbing works has the advantage of engaging the subject and its powers
in actual courses of constructive artistic labor and of promoting identification with the artistic subject capable of such construction. It brings into view
the possibility of some stability for the subject in attachment to the continuing labor of artistic making. If, however, all claims to represent something
beyond the medium are suspended, then there is at least something of a
danger of a flight from life into formalism and aestheticism.
(6) Finally, there is Holderlin. What is most distinctive about Holderlin's
approach to the problem of orientation is his development of the doctrine
and poetic practice of Wechsel or modulation. In Holderlin's hands, Wechsel comes to mean appropriately modulated alternation among various
poetic moods: heroic, na'ive, ideal, and so on. More abstractly, Holderlin's
practice of Wechsel embodies the thought that "a conflict is necessary
between [1] the most original postulate of the spirit which aims at [the]
communality and unified simultaneity of all parts, and [2] the other postulate which commands the spirit to move beyond itself and reproduce itself"
(Holderlin 1988, 62). The subject alternates, that is to say, between
moments of receptivity and absorption, on the one hand, and moments of
striving, form-making, and self-assertion, on the other. (Dieter Henrich
sums this up as the persistence of the conflict between love and selfhood
within Holderlin's writing [1997, 127-28].) Narration of the alternation of
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such moods displaces theoretical grasp of something "over against" the subject as a means of finding and sustaining valuable orientation in life. The
hope of Holderlin's poetic practice is that the alternations that mark his
writing will be not brute, but modulated. They will embody a working
through and bringing into relative (but not perfect) balance of the conflicting tendencies toward love-absorption-stability and selfhood-independencedeparture that mark modern human life. This practice involves a certain
foregrounding of an elegiac, lyric voice that is aware of its own alternations,
and it involves also a certain commitment to endlessness of conflict and of
the poetic registering of conflict, against the claims of theory. The wager is
that the registering of conflict as modulation will enable enough recognition
and stability on the part of the subject to go on, that it will yield just enough
orientation, claiming neither too much nor too little. Commitment to
reflection and to the work of writing is balanced against receptivity to and
involvement in nature and others.
To recapitulate, the possibilities that are in view for thinking about how
to achieve continuing, self-determining orientation for human subjects in
post-Kantian modernity are:
r. Reinhold-Fichte: epistemological theory

Hegel: historical-descriptive social theory
3. Schlegel-Blanchot: spontaneity, agility, and wit
4. Wordsworth-Proust-Benjamin: recovery of fugitive experiences
5. Wellbery (following Eichendorff, Goethe): constructing thick artistic
presentations
6. Holderlin: the lyric that embodies modulation
2.

Among these six possibilities, I find Holderlin's suggestion to be most capacious in incorporating elements of each of 3, 4, and 5. But what remains to
be seen is exactly how in at least some exemplary cases 3, 4, 5, and 6 might
fruitfully be combined. What, that is, might a successful, self-determining,
orientation-intimating modulation of mood, constructed by spontaneity,
taking up the recovery of the fugitive, and achieving thick artistic presentation look like? And how might such an orientation-intimating modulation
help subjects in modernity to find some sort of assurance about value in life?
Though it does not have quite the directness in treating the powers and
interest of literary language of either theories that tend toward formalism
or theories such as Holderlin's that emphasize the agon of the reflecting
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subject, Goethe's own poetic theory also embodies an effort to bring
together spontaneity, receptivity, thickness of form, and modulation. 3
Goethe's poetology is, however, not as well known as it might be, largely
because it is most fully developed in connection with his metaphysics of
nature, as he attempts to work out a comprehensive theory of human being
in relation to a natural world that itself bears meanings. As Walter Benjamin
insightfully remarked, "the place occupied in Goethe's writings by his scientific studies is the one which in lesser artists is commonly reserved for aesthetics" (1999, 172). More specifically, Goethe's morphology embodies the
fundamental thought that everything that is is both interpretable and
expressive in relation to human subjects. "Morphology rests on the conviction that everything that is must also show itself and be adumbrated. We
take this fundamental principle to be valid for everything from the first
physical and chemical elements up to the spiritual expressions of mankind"
(Goethe 2003, 45; my translation). This may have little plausibility in the
face of our experience of, say, iron ore or salt, or more broadly, of our
materialist conception of the world. Our interactions with iron ore and salt
have more to do with measurement, theorizing, and use than they do with
interpretation or with deciphering meanings, in any ready senses of these
terms. To this extent, we are, as modern subjects especially and as makers
of meanings, cast into culture and outside the self-enclosedness of a physical
nature that is externally available for use and as an object of theorizing.
Goethe's theory of nature seems too much to look backwards toward older,
discredited religio-mythological views.
This impression can be somewhat softened, however, when we note how
Goethe specifically develops his theory of form in relation to objects that
are interpreted, objects such as works of art and human actions of various
kinds. Here Goethe observes that "form is a moving something, a becoming,
a passing away. The theory of form is the theory of transformation" (45).
This claim emphasizes the constructive activity of the interpreting subject
who is positing forms as much as simply finding them immanent in things,
and it emphasizes also that the construction of form is both bound up in
time and answerable to changeable interests on the part of the interpreting
subject. Form is both "the brought forth and the becoming of what is
brought forth" (48). When it comes to poetic texts, this claim enables us to
see the form of the poem itself-its way of holding together its beginning,
middle, and end in an overall plot-as all at once materially embodied,
emergent both for the author in the course of writing and for the reader in
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the course of reading, shaped by interest and need, and temporally developing. As in Holderlin's theory of modulation, the struggle to make meaning
via modulation that lets something happen, that lets form emerge, and that
is answerable to the needs of a temporally and spatially situated subject is
more important than the statement of any ready doctrine or Lehre. Or, as
Goethe himself puts it, "Because very few of our experiences allow themselves to be wholly articulated and directly communicated, I have for a long
time chosen the means of a repeated reflection, so that I could through
opposed and at the same time reciprocally reflecting images reveal to those
who could notice the secret sense of things" (letter to Carl Jakob Ludwig
Iken, September 27, 1827, cited in Witte and Otto 1996, 20; my translation). The task of poetry is then to allow our experience to express itself
roundly and to be communicated, and this task is carried out through juxtaposing images that let sense and form emerge for those who pay attention
in the right way.
We can, I think, make further sense of these poetological claims-both the
Holderlinian strategy of Wechsel and the Goethean strategy of juxtaposition
for the sake of the emergence of sense-by turning to theories of what
makes artistic expression distinctively different from other forms of meaning-making that are either more prosaic or more nakedly revelatory of self,
without craft and control.
Art in general involves, I have argued (following many others), the
attempt to achieve the expression of emotion and attitude-a way of seeking satisfaction of a desire that one's ways of responding to and feeling
about perplexing initiators be endorsable. Am I right to feel perplexity, sadness, I don't know what, in relation to an initiating scene or incident? This
is the question that is all but explicitly on the minds of many imaginative
literary writers as they work. To get some feel for how this is so, we might
think, for example, of Shakespeare in writing Hamlet as undertaking to
figure what to think and feel about the competing claims of honor-traditionclan vs. individuality and about the proper roles of conscience, proof, eros,
deference, family piety, and so on in sorting out these competing claims.
Making a poem, play, or other work of literary art can, then, be a way
of exploring and resolving emotions, thoughts, and attitudes that arise in
relation to perplexing scenes and incidents of life. Exactly how might artistic
writing manage to do this? Considering well-known theories of emotion
and expression in art can help us to address this question. These theories
fall into three main groups.
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(A) There are, first of all, psychodynamic theories of artistic expression.
Such a theory is often ascribed to both Benedetto Croce and R. G. Collingw d especially if o ne focu ses only on part I of The Principles of Ai·t ignoring Collingwood
ubsequent general elaboration of a theory of human
subject development and di cursive consciou ness and their relations to language and culrure. Collingwood does hold that arti tic expre ion i dj tinguished from ordinary planned making (techne) by the fact that the
distinctions between planning and execution, mean and end raw material
and fini hed product and form and matter have no place in it (1938,
20-25). Thi makes it eem a though artistic expression is nothing but a
pontaneous welling up of emotion omehow-without thought or planning-manife ring it elf in materials (words or sto.ne or paint or bodily
motions) that are being rhap odically manipulated. Collingwood explicitly
denies this implication, in distinguishing between the expression of emotion,
which nece sari ly involves some control over the process, and the beu·ayal
of emotion, which does not (121-24). He does not, however, at least in part
I, give a very good account of the sort of intelligent conrrol (that i not
techne) that i e ·ercised in arti tic expre ion in contrast with betrayal. Th
advanragc of a psychodynamic account, however, i that it empha izes tl1at
burdens of feeling attin.ide emotion, and respon e are felt by human ubjects and tl1at these burdens can b di harged or lightened through expressive activity. omething in us that is to ay, is getting out of us via. arci tic
expression, in uch a way that actually occurring burden and perplexiti.es
of feeling and stance are lightened and calmed.
(B) There are, second, structural-linguistic theories of artistic expression,
of the kind developed by Nelson Goodman and Alan Tormey (see Goodman
1996; Tormey 1987, 421-37). Goodman, in particular define expression
as a species of ignification that arises out of rhe conscious, killed manipulation of a language or code with distinct tructural features, syntactic and
emantic. More speci6cally, expression is metaphorical exempli'fication,
where exemplification first of all, is possession of a quality (falJjng under a
general term) plus reference back to the quality possessed (or the general
term that i applicable). For example, a tailor' watch po e es the color
weight, pattern, and weave of the larger bolt of cloth that it also refer back
to; or a paint chip both pos e se and refers back to the color of the paint
that appears on it. uch swatches and chips are used a representative amples of general features that are al o found el ewhere: the sample and what
it refer back to share, as it were an ovei:all phy iognomy. Metaphorical
exemplification or artistic expression is then exemplification (possession
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plus reference back) in an unusual, unexpected way. For example, Beethoven's Pathetique Sonata both possesses (the characteristic contour and
rhythm of) sadness and refers back to sadness (Goodman r996, 8 5-9 5 ).
The advantage of this account is that it highlights the craft or skill of
putting significative exemplification into a work. Artists need not be, and
typically are not, caught up in a rush of feeling in the moment in which they
are doing their work. Instead they are paying careful attention to how in a
medium to exemplify emotions in an unusual way: Rembrandt exemplifying
in paint his love for Hendrikje Stoeffels by making the painted canvas possess and show it; Liszt exemplifying his melancholy yet serene religiosity in
his late Transcendental Etudes by making them possess and show it, and
so on.
This disadvantage of this account, however, is that it underrates the
importance of feeling-with on the part of the audience. Successful expression becomes, apparently, colder than in psychodynamic theories, a matter
of embedding properties in a work so as to convey a message rather than
issuing to an audience invitations to participate in feeling and its clarification. Hence it both misses the importance of having emotions to having a
point of view as a subject in general and, more specifically, misses the passions and urgencies that drive both artistic making and response to art. And
it misses, further, the singularity of successful artistic expression, where we
want, often, to dwell in or with the work-to experience just its way of
rendering thought and emotion in its materials-rather than decoding it to
find some more general message about kinds of emotions.
(C) Third, there are intransitive theories that focus on distinctive success
in the formal arrangement of materials; expressive is treated as a near-synonym for successful. Garry Hagberg ( r99 5, ro3-9) and Roger Scruton
(2004, r-9) have developed theories of this kind. Such theories often take
as their point of departure Wittgenstein's remark in The Brown Book that
there is an "intransitive ... usage" of the word "particular" to convey "an
emphasis" (r958, r58). Similarly, we can use the word "expressive" as a
commendatory adjective, as in "her playing was expressive," without filling
in that it is expressive of anything. The advantage of this view is that it
highlights both the importance of care in producing the work and the singularity of success: one work may be successfully expressive in this way, while
even a closely similar work is not: in certain simple sonatas, a single note or
two here or there may make all the difference between Mozart and Czerny.
The disadvantage of this view, however, is that it does not show how
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satisfaction in doing the work of formal arrangement is driven by and
bound up with matters of feeling. Hence this view at least drifts toward a
more decorativist formalism.
It seems reasonable to conclude that there are some insights and some
blind sp ts in each of the e three view . We should try to integrate the
in ight of each of them while avoiding their 1ni reps. In th Prefac to
Lyrical Ballads, Wordsworth begins usefully to develop ju t uch a ynthetic
view. In poetry, he argues, the aim is not the trnightforward comm unication only f information about an object, but .rather the pre entation and
clarification of fe ling in relation to it. The feeling therein develop d give
importance to th e action and situation, and n t the action and situation to
the feeling' ( 'Preface to the Second Edition of Lyrical Ballads ( oo),' in
Word worth 1965, 448). When the work of poerry goes well, then the poet
will describe objects, and utter en timeot , of uc.h a natUJ·e, a.nd in such
connection with each other, that the understanding of the Reader must necessarily be in ome degre enlightened, and hi affections strengthened and
purified (448 emphasis added ). The idea then, i that the ucce ful poeti
work present both a ubject matter and a course of thought and £ eling
about the subject matter, with the aim of working through the thoughts and
feeling , via the formal arrangement of word that pre enc ubje t matter
thought and feeling u11til the thought and feelings become evid ndy
more apt in relation to the su bject ma.tter. Our aff ction -how we are
inve ted emotionally in things, positively or negatively-become crength ened and purified, in being purged of anything accidental and inappropriate
to their objects.
This Wordsworthian stance is a primary source (along with materials on
clarification from Aristotle, Spinoza, and Collingwood 4 ) for an elucidatory
definition of art that I have proposed and defended . (Thi definition is elu idatory in that it seeks not taxonomic exa mess or the transformation of
difficult or borderline cases of whether something i a work of art into ea y
ones, buc rather an illuminati n explanation of the functio n in human life
of the practices of art, as a hieved in a wide range of exemplary case .) That
definition i that a work of art is a pre entation of "a ubject matter a a
focu for thought and motional attitude, distinctively fu ed to the imaginative exploration of material (Eldridge 2003, 259 and below) for the sa ke
of working through ne's emotions in relation to a community of ome
excent that ·hares with the arti t both a w rid and emotions in relation
to it. 5

122

Narrative, Emoli-On, and Insight

The production of a work of art, and especially of a work of poetry,
begins, then, with an initial disturbance or puzzlement or perplexity occaionecl by ao obje t, per on cene, or in ident. Ooe feels omehow omething, but exactly what one feel why one feel it, and whether ones feeli ng
i apt to it initiator are all Jes thao clear. The respon e to this perplexity
that literary art achieves i th.en to find the narratively apt cause of a now
more specifically articulated and acknowledged feeling that is now more
evidently appropriate in relation to an overall situation. That is to say, one
tells a story; one rehearses what is or may be going on in the course of
having a feeling. This involves asking, what in the initiator is perplexing,
and why? How and why, for example, am I perplexed, troubled, or transported in this specific way by this initiator? And it involves narrating the
course of development of feeling itself as the story of its occasioning is generated, so that the feeling itself becomes caught up in reflection and so further specified and articulated, as one is guided in narrating by an effort to
find the exact word, image, and cadence in sound that will yield clarity.
Or, to revert to Wordsworth, descriptions and sentiments are presented in
connection with each other in such a way that our affections are strengthened and purified. The fact that the situating of thoughts and feelings within
an overall course of development (guided by the search for apt comparisons
and for cadential resolution) clarifies them helps to make sense of what
Aristotle means in saying both that plot is "the origin and as it were the
soul" (1987, 9) of tragic drama and that a successful narrative plot presents
"things that are possible in accordance with probability or necessity" (12).
The soul of lyric in particular is specifically the narratively structured working through and articulation of emotion in relation to an initiator, so as to
achieve greater stability, calm, formal success, and satisfaction in it (however ecstatic, horrific, beatific, disruptive, etc. the initial response may itself
both be and remain). A narrative arc from disturbance to calm informs the
process of working through, where working through is central to poetic
process.
Remarks at this level of generality are all too likely to carry neither conviction nor intelligibility in the absence of detailed attention to a concrete
example of the work of successfully expressive poetic art. It is impossible
for any single work to illuminate clearly the powers and interest of all
poetry, let alone of literature in general. But it remains possible to read a
single poem closely, in the hope that an account of its powers and interest
may at least serve as a model for how to begin to approach other cases.
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J. W. Goethe's "Wandrers Nachtlied II I Wayfarer's Night Song II" is the
single most well-known short lyric poem in all German literature. It remains
to this day the poem that German schoolchildren are given to memorize at
the age of twelve or thirteen, so that it stands, for many, as the means of
their first serious reflective encounter with serious adult literature. It was,
famously, carved by Goethe into the wall of a traveler's hut on the top of
the Gickelhahn, a small mountain overlooking the Thuringer Wald, outside
Ilmenau, at about 8 p.m. on September 6, 1780. 6 One can still climb the
Gickelhahn today to see a reconstruction of the hut, just below the peak,
with the carving reproduced. The poem has been set to music by at least
forty-five composers, including Kempff, Liszt, Mendelssohn-Hensel, Reger,
Schubert, and Schumann, as well as Ralph Shapey and Charles Ives. Just
what did Goethe do in this short lyric poem, and why has it figured, and
why does it continue to figure, so prominently in the German, and not only
German, sense of the expressive powers of imaginative literature?
Uber allen Gipfeln
1st Ruh,
In alien Wipfeln
Sptirest du
Kaum einen Hauch;
Die Vogelein schweigen im Walde.
Warte nur, balde
Ruhest du auch.
[Over all the hilltops
is calm.
In all the treetops
you feel
hardly a breath.
The little birds fall silent in the woods.
Just wait ... soon
you too will be at rest.]7
In order to enter into the work of this poem, it is useful to begin by
asking two fundamental questions: ( l) Who is the du-addressee? and (2)
What does ruhen mean?
(1) A number of possibilities for the du-addressee immediately suggest
themselves. It may be the faithful little dog who has accompanied Goethe
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up the mountain and who is now not quite yet settled to rest. No doubt this
possibility is somewhat fanciful, but consider the last lines of "Gute Nacht!"
the last poem in Goethe's West-ostlicher Divan: "Ja, das Hiindlein gar, das
treue I Darf die Herren hinbegleiten" [Yes, the little dog even, the loyal
one, I May accompany the masters] (in Goethe 2006, II8; my translation).
Being accompanied by a loyal dog is a kind of metaphor or metonymy (perhaps both) for the achievement of trust, loyalty, and exemplary mastery in
relation to an audience. "Gute Nacht!" is a poem about a hope for success
as a human subject in writing. It begins "Nun, so legt euch, liebe Lieder, I
An den Busen meinem Volke!" [Now, lay you, dear songs I In the bosom of
my people] (117; my translation), and it concludes this expression of hope
for reception with an image of a dog, freely devoting itself out of loyalty to
accompanying its master.
Less fancifully, Goethe's eminent biographer Nicholas Boyle argues that
the addressee is entirely general. Specifically, "The 'you' is not-not specifically or by allusion-the woman [Charlotte von Stein] to whom Goethe was
writing only minutes before, and after, he composed the poem" (1991, 266).
This claim is part of Boyle's overall argument that Goethe's early poetry is
"the poetry of desire" {the subtitle of volume l, which goes up to 1790),
more specifically of desire unstilled, but expressed. "The sources of his
poetry ran deeper, and purer, than 'the sweet conversation of my inmost
heart' that was his mental discourse with Charlotte von Stein" (266).
Goethe practiced "an art not of possession but of desire, of a sensuous presence always suffused with recollection, reflection, or anticipation: that
unfulfilled desire for the always absent object was the origin of his personal,
as of his literary magnetism" (429). That is, Goethe's poetry is the deep
poetry of a discursive, commitment-and project-having consciousness that
is cut off from perfect wholeness, thus given over to wandering and suffused
with a standing desire for presentness. This all seems quite right. But it is
also the case that a specific address to an absent lover might itself be an
expression of this standing desire, be the claim to or hope for intimacy in
wandering with another who singularly, but absently, is a synecdoche for
the possibility of redemptive intimacy. The desire persists, because she is
absent, but an intimacy is sought in relation to her in this moment of
address.
More importantly, however, Boyle's emphasis on the generality of the
addressee points toward the addressee as either oneself (the poet himself) or
anyone (or both). The thought is, "I have been in motion, first in climbing
up here, and second in being busy in professional and social life (the life of
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the Weimar court) about the affairs of the world, and calm for me has not
been possible." And this thought about activity failing to yield calm, that is,
about lack of full assurance in and identification with busy activity, is a
thought that might come to anyone. In fact, the most natural reading of du
in line 4 is "anyone," that is, anyone who might happen to be here in this
spot at this moment; and anyone who, further, feeling this stillness might be
prompted to share a sense of exteriority to the calm of bare nature, because
caught up in busy activity, hence an intimate second subject or du. We will
come in a moment to consider what thought and possibilities of feeling and
consolation are then offered to such a du-anyone and how they might be
achieved.
(2) What does ruhen mean? Surely, as with the English "rest," it means
both sleep and death. As with the birds falling silent, sleep will come, and
so, too, will death. T. W. Adorno made much of this connection in his commentary on the poem. "In the line, 'Warte nur, balde' the whole of life, with
an enigmatic smile of sorrow, turns into the brief moment before one falls
asleep .... In the face of nature at rest, a nature from which all traces of
anything resembling the human have been eradicated, the subject becomes
aware of its own insignificance. Imperceptibly, silently, irony tinges the
poem's consolation: the seconds before the bliss of sleep are the same seconds that separate our brief life from death" (Adorno 1991, 41-42).
Much of this is right: ruhen does indicate both sleep and death. All traces
of the human have been eradicated from nature. This is registered formally
in the repeated U sounds and soft F's, as though nature were speaking a
semiotic mother tongue that precedes ego formation and will outlast ego
identity. (Against this musicality, Hauch and Auch then come as interruptive, then conclusive, moments of the enactment of identity. I will come back
to this.) The poet is thinking about that fact-about a nature that will survive his eradication; that is, he is thinking about his own death and about
the meaning, if any, of the life that will have preceded it. (Compare the
opening of Wordsworth's "Tintern Abbey": "Five years have passed . . .
The day is come when I again repose I Here, under this dark sycamore" [in
Wordsworth 1965, lo8; emphasis added].) Adorno's phrase "becomes
aware of its own insignificance" implies that the restless, anxious striving
to master the terms of significance has been first voiced and then, somehow,
calmed. A movement from disturbed restlessness to acceptance has somehow taken place.
Adorno then argues further that the restlessness of the subject or the
sense of being caught up in busyness arises from the experience being caught
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up in modern omm,odicy ociety. G eth
lyric expresse a protest again r
that cial world. In its prate t the poem expre e rhe dream of a world
in which thing would be different. The lyric spirit' idio yncratic oppo iti.on to the up ri r power of material things is a form of reaction to the
reification of the world to th d mimnion of human being by commodities
that ha developed since the beginning of the modern era since the indu tria l revolution became the dominant force in life" (Ad mo 1991, 40). Her
the thought that rhi particular lyric expres e at least in pare a reaction to
its particular ocial world i at lea t plau ible, though I am somewhat
inclined to ay that it expresses a ense of undirected restlessne in the
fa e of the tillne and self- ontinuity of nature, which sen e f undirected
restlessnes might com t anyone in any culture, though it is perhaps more
typical in modern commodity society. But it i urely righr that th poem
"expre e. the dream of a world in which thing would be different, ' a
world in whi h the rre e of ego-formation and the bearing of ego-i.clentity
would be moderated or redeemed.
ju t how doe it do rhi ? According to Adorn , the work re i r commodi.ty society and re i t more generally a world in which undirected bu ynes
predominates "by refusing to ubmit to anything heteronomou and constituting it elf in a cordance with its own law ' (40). That is, i.t achieve
through aptnes of reflecti n and forma l artistry a coincidence of f rma l
and thematic cl ure and it achieve a kind of fuUne of both attention to
life and expres ion of that attention .
Adorno goe on to a y that the peaking J in rhi poem "ha · lo t Ina cure]
a it were and attempt to re t re it through animation, through immersion
in the I' itself" (41). (Gyorgy Luka make a imilar point ab ut lyric in
general in remarking that "at the lyrical moment the purest interioriry of
the oul, er apart from duration without choice, lifted abov the ob curelydcterrninecl multiplicity of thing ,
lidifies into ub ranee· whilst ali. n,
unknowable nature is driven from within to agglomerate into a ymbol that
i illuminated thr ughout" l1971 63J.) To say that the "I has lo t nature
is to ay fir r that in po e ing di cur ive ubjectivity and reflectiven s a
human subject is n ta being in and through whom everything imply happen the way it happen in and rhrough a 1 af that change color ar a certain
time of year. Rather, a human ubject can reflect on and que tion it exi •
rence and
i not or i no long r, immer ed in mere naturalnc s. This n t
r no longer being immer ed i xperienced as a lo , an experience of los
that i perhaps exacerbated by the undirected busyne of modern commodity soci cy. What i my cho ing to be about rhis or that for? What, if anything doth ir avail? What doe my life mean? Tbe e are the que tions that
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are on the speaker's mind-the thoughts that are disturbing him-within
his experience of the stillness of nature.
The solution is then to achieve animation, immersion in the I itself. I
take this to mean fullness of attention in expressing this experience; the
achievement of wholeheartedness or fullness of cathexis in and to the activity of giving apt voice to what one's situation and experience are. We might
further note that the formal craft of the poem, specifically its pattern of
repetitions, functions to lend a stillness to nature. The repeated Uber-Ruhdu-suggesting a musicality and the repetitive babblings of the prediscursive-of the first four lines is interrupted by the harder Kaum-Hauch, then
restored by the Ruhest-du of the last line, with the rhyming auch lending
formal closure. The "I" has then emerged from a prediscursive position,
found this situation troubling, spoken with formal unity, clarity, and medial
thickness, and so come to terms with its situation. Spatially, the movement
toward calm and the acceptance of (disturbing) thought and feeling is indicated in the movement of the poet's gaze and attention downward, from the
mountaintops to the treetops to the birds in the trees to, by implication, the
ground (ruhen). 8 Hence it can utter the auch that repeats the interruptive,
percussive Hauch, and in echoing it achieves dramatic closure. That is, the
speaking voice, having worked this material thematically and formally, can
take responsibility for and find itself to be at one with this work. The father
tongue, one might say, takes up, responds to, and closes the prior speech of
the mother tongue, and so achieves its own proper fullness. 9 Nature will
continue beyond the life of the individual discursive subject, who will not
know all. But life can be accepted and lived anyway. Having fitly exercised
one's powers is worth something, is perhaps even a form of temporary satisfaction that is beyond normal, somewhat happenstantial work and love. In
this way, love for life as a discursive, human subject is achieved or
reachieved, despite the senses of loss and of immersion in undirected busyness. One has, at least, reflected, felt, thought, and written fully, anyway.
"Es war doch so schon." 10 Or as Adorno puts it, "[The] pure subjectivity
[of lyric poems], the aspect of them that appears seamless and harmonious,
bears witness to its opposite, to suffering in an existence alien to the subject
and to love for it as well-indeed their harmoniousness is actually nothing
but the mutual accord of this suffering and this love" (I99I, 4I).
To bear witness to suffering in an alien existence, but to love that existence anyway (insofar as fullness of expression is possible within and in
relation to that existence; fullness of the achievement of what discursivity
and reflectiveness and language discover themselves to be for), and to bear
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witness to that love as well-to do all this is to return to a sense of a harmoniousness of subjectivity with a nature and world that remain discordant
from it, to move from disturbance to the thought and feeling that the world
is good enough for us to live in it, at least to this extent: it has permitted
this fullness of exercise of human powers of attention and expression. This
strikes me as a centrally exemplary achievement-all at once formal, thematic, and emotional-of lyric and of art in general. I have no doubt that
we need a more impersonal, constructivist politics of institutions, where
compromises in social life will be necessary. I have no doubt that abstract,
philosophical accounts of the nature of cognitive achievements in science
and mathematics can be illuminating. Political philosophy and epistemology
have their roles in life. But so, too, I think, does the aesthetic thinking-the
thinking of the human subject in modernity in thick material forms-that
this poem embodies.

NOTES
I am grateful to Joan Vandegrift, as well as to discussion with audiences at the Greater Philadelphia Philoso phy Consortium session on Emotion, at the University of Chicago Workshop on
Forms of Lyric (especially H annah Eldridge, Michael Payne, and David Wellbery), at the University of Warwick Conference on Poetry and Philosophy (especially Jorie Graham and Stephen Houlgate) , at the University of East Anglia, and at the University of Freiburg, Freiburg
Research Institute for Advance Studies (especia lly Werner Frick), for helpful comments on
earlier versions of this essay.
r. On Fichte's repeated attempts to refou nd his system as a cycle of procession and epistrophe, see Eldridge (r997, 62-7r).
2. On imaginative rehearsal as a response to a felt sense of possibilities of death-in-life,
see Eldridge (2008, 69-85).
3. I am grateful to Hannah Eldridge for calling my attention to Goethe's poetology in his
scientific writings.
4. Collingwood's full theory of artistic expression, arrived a t only in part III, a fter he has
developed his accounts of the development of the discursive subject and of the indispensable
importance of the media of ar t and of the audience to successful ar tmaking, is much closer to
the required integrative view of expression than it is often taken to be.
5. See Eldridge (2008, especially chaps. r, 4) for a fuller account of the process of working
through as it is carried out in and through poetic composition.
6. The circumstances of the composition of Goethe's two " Wandrers Nachtlied" poems
are recounted in Boyle (199 r, 266).
7. In Goethe (2005, 34); translation modified from that by Hyde Flippo, which is
archived at http://german.about.com/library/blwander.htm.
8. I owe this point to Jorie Graham in di sc ussion at the Universi ty of Warwick .
9. I take the terms "father tongue" and "mother tongue" and the account of the relation
between them from Stanley Cavell's adaptation/adoption of Thoreau's use of "father tongue"
in Cavel! (r97 2, 15-16).
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ro. Herbert Marcuse takes this line, which appears both in the "Tiirmerlied" ("Song of the
Tower Warden") in Goethe's Faust and as the last words in Wedekind's Pandora's Box, as
expressing a fundamental attitude of art toward life. There is a "reconciliation which ...
catharsis offers [that] also preserves the irreconcilable" (Marcuse I978, 59).
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